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IN 'l~HE SUPREME COURT 
()1~~ THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ST.\'l'E OF l.~·r.\H, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs-
.\:\.\S'f.\(~10 GALLEGOS, aka 
'rED c;.\LLEGOS, and 
Jlr~\~ R:\LLES GALLEGOS, aka 
R. \ \p GALLEGOS, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 10109 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
ST.\TE~IENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellants \\·ere jointly tried for the crime of murder 
in the first degree, and convicted upon jury trial of murder 
in thr second degree, from which convictions they have 
jointly appealed. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellants \\·ere jointly charged by information with 
the crime of murder in the first degree in violation of 
76-30-1&3, Utah Code Annotated 1953. Upon jury trial 
in the Third Judicial District, the Honorable Ray VanCott, 
Jr .. judge, the appellants were found guilty of murder in 
the second degree and committed to the Utah State Prison. 
RELIEF SOlTGHT 0~ APPEAL 
The respondent submits the judgment should be affirmed. 
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2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent submits the following statement of facts 
as being more directly in accord with what was presented 
below. 
On 4 November 1961, Robert Fernandez was knifed by 
a person he could recognize, but whose name he did not 
know (R. 164, 167). He was hospitalized for two months 
from the knife wounds. The appellant, Ted Gallegos had 
knifed Fernandez (R. 167). Fernandez periodically had 
looked for the person who knifed him and around 4 August 
1963, he saw Ted Gallegos in Liberty Park (R. 168). Fer-
nandez had learned Gallegos' identity sometime before. 
On 4 August 1963, a Sunday, Raul Yanes, Max James and 
Dave Albo were in the company of Fernandez when he saw 
Ted Gallegos ( R. 168) . Upon seeing Gallegos, F emandez 
and some of his companions went to Fernandez's home and 
got some baseball bats (R. 169). They returned to Liberty 
Park where Fernandez encountered Gallegos and asked if 
he were "Albert Martinez" ( R. 170). Gallegos said he was 
not and told Fernandez who he was, whereupon Fernandez 
struck Gallegos several times in the head with the bat, 
knocking him to the ground and rendering him uncon-
scious ( R. 171 ) . David Albo struck Bob Rivenburgh who 
was standing with Gallegos ( R. 190, 222). Raul Yanes was 
standing behind Fernandez and after Gallegos was knocked 
down, Yanes may have kicked him (R. 223). Fernandez 
and the others left and Gallegos was taken to the Salt Lake 
County Hospital where Dr. Gary Morrison gave him treat-
ment for his injuries (R. 304). 
Subsequent to Ted Gallegos' release from the hospital, 
the Salt Lake Police were contacted; however, Ted and 
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Ra v Gallegos and others started to look for the assailant 
. ' 
(R. 316). 
On 10 October 1963, David Albo was in the El Prado 
Tavern in Salt Lake. Ray Gallegos, Ted Gallegos and 
Richard Jerome were all present (R. 191, 229). Jerome 
approached Albo and told him it was a lousy thing that had 
been done to Ted Gallegos and said that they were going to 
get him (R. 191). Thereupon, someone held Albo's arms 
behind him and Ray Gallegos hit him in the head with a 
bottle or a glass causing his head to bleed (R. 192, 237). 
Upon being hit, Albo ran out the door and down to the 
Hideout Bar (R. 192). He was followed by the appellants 
and Jerome (R. 233-236) and was threatened that they 
\vere going to get all of the park attackers ( R. 193, 241 ) . 
Albo remained in the Hideout. The bartender put down 
the disturbance and Albo left with some other friends. 
Prior to this incident, the Gallegos brothers knew that 
one of the park assailants was a little man. Raul Yanes was 
only 4'9Y2" and weighed about 100 pounds (R. 155). On 
A.ugust 10, 1963, Yanes was seen at the Annex Bar around 
10: 00-10: 30 p.m. Around midnight, Mike Hoopiiana, an 
ex-convict on parole ( R. 25 7), saw Raul Yanes at the 
Cro\rs Nest Tavern on 4th South and State Streets (R. 
258). He gave Yanes a ride in his automobile to the Annex 
Bar at 7th South and State Streets ( R. 259) . Hoopiiana 
parked his car in a parking lot adjacent to a building on 
the northwest comer of 7th South and State Streets (R. 
259-261 ) . Yanes and Hoopiiana started to walk to the 
Annex when Hoopiiana heard a "few people" running 
to,,·ards him from behind (R. 260-261). Someone pushed 
Hoopiiana up against the building on the comer and told 
him to "stay out of it or you will get hurt" ( R. 261 ) . The 
person had a knife and was identified as Ray Gallegos. 
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Raul Yanes was knocked down by Ted Gallegos who then 
reached down and knifed Yanes in the heart ( R. 262). Ray 
Gallegos made a pass at Yanes as he fell ( R. 263). There-
after, the Gallegoses and others ran off through the parking 
lot. Mike Hoopiiana then walked into the Annex Bar, 
stayed for a moment, and then left. Several persons ob-
served some people running from the deceased as he fell 
(R.250,253,254,255). 
Shortly after midnight, Keith Larsen left the Annex Bar 
(R. 245). He passed two persons as he went to his car. As 
he started backing his automobile, he heard footsteps and 
looked over and saw a man lying on the ground bleeding 
badly ( R. 246-248) . The area where the killing occurred 
was well lighted ( R. 136, 137, 139, 24 7). 
Subsequently, Hoopiiana contacted his attorney, Norm 
Wade, and identified the appellants as the killers ( R. 290). 
Wade was concerned in case Hoopiiana may have been 
seen at the scene and could be charged ( R. 277). Wade, 
therefore, contacted the County Attorney's office ( R. 266) 
and Hoopiiana gave the police a statement. The statement 
(Exhibit 18) was read into the record, curiously enough at 
defense counsel's request. The statement given to the police 
on 13 August, 1963 ( R. 283) recited: 
"Well, I went to a reunion at my mother's house, and 
I got there about 7:OOPM. We was having a kind of 
get together or party, on Saturday, the lOth, and we 
stayed there until about 11: OOPM. I don't know the 
name of this bar, but it's on 33rd South. We stayed 
there about 45 minutes. My sister became ill, and so 
I drove her home. I got her home at 12: 00 Midnight. 
I left her house, and was driving home along State 
Street, when I seen Raul Yanes, walking between 4th 
and 5th South. Which was about 10 minutes after 
12: 00 Midnight. I stopped and asked him where he 
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'vas going, and he said to the Annex Bar. So I.drove 
hirn down there. We parked the car in the parkmg lot 
that faces 7th South, and it was about between 10 and 
15 minutes after. We got out of my car, and walked 
to the parking lot to State Street. 
"\ Ve reached the street and all at once I heard run-
ning feet. I turned around, and there were four men 
"·ith knivrs. The tallest of the four put the knife on me 
and said that if I moved he would cut my head off. I 
backed against the building and asked him what his 
beef \vas. Then at this time, I looked at Raul and this 
other man which I recognized as Ted Gallegos, said 
in an angry voice, "Hello Raul." And smacked him 
and then pushed him against the building and pulled 
him around the corner. And I seen his hand with the 
knife slashing horizontally at Raul's stomach. Then 
Raul fell down onto State Street. And as he was fall-
ing, the man who had the knife on me whom I recog-
nized as Ray Gallegos, reached over and stabbed Raul 
in the back. As Raul was laying on the ground, Ted 
Gallegos reached down and stuck the knife in the left 
side of Raul's chest, two or three times. After I had 
seen this, I began inching my way along the building 
towards the door of the Annex Bar. The men seemed 
to be puzzled as to what to do. I got about ten feet 
away, inching along the building, and then I turned 
and walked to the door of the Annex and went inside. 
I stayed inside about two minutes, long enough to get 
my mind straight as to what had happened. Then I 
\valked back out the front door and walked past Raul's 
body. Raul was laying on his back with his arms bent 
and his forearms in the air. At this time, I was positive 
?e ,,·as dead. I walked through the parking lot, got 
mto my car, and then went home." 
Raul \y anes died of the stab wound in the heart ( R. 160). 
The autopsy disclosed three wounds: one to the heart, one 
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in the left side, and one cutting wound across the upper 
stomach ( R. 154 ) . 
The appellants did not testify, and the jury returned a 
verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree. Other 
pertinent facts will be discussed as they relate to the points 
urged on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THAT MANSLAUGH-
TER REQUIRED AN INTENT TO KILL SINCE 
A. THE JURY RETURNED A VERDICT OF SECOND 
DEGREE MURDER AND THE ERROR ON THE 
LESSER OFFENSE COULD NOT HAVE PREJUDICED. 
B. THE EVIDENCE DID NOT WARRANT AN INSTRUC-
TION ON MANSLAUGHTER. 
The appellants in Point I of their brief challenge Instruc-
tion No. 11 ( R. 346) given by the court on the crime of 
voluntary manslaughter. In State v. CoboJ 90 U.2d 89, 60 
P.2d 952 ( 1936), this court ruled that one of the essential 
elements to the crime of voluntary manslaughter was that 
the killing be willful or intentional or that the infliction of 
great bodily harm be done willfully and intentionally. The 
C obo case is somewhat inconsistent to the extent that at 
one point a disjunctive "or" is used and another point, con-
junctive "and" is used when the elements discussed do not 
warrant the difference. Respondent admits that the trial 
court erred in Instruction No. 11 by failing to instruct that 
the killing must have been intentional or willful if the ap-
pellants were to be convicted of voluntary manslaughter. 
However, the respondent submits that the appellants were 
not prejudiced by the instruction that was given since (a) 
the appellants were convicted of murder in the second de-
gree, which is a higher offense, and the jury must have nec-
essarily found each of the elements required for the convic-
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tion of the crime of second degree; and (b) that the trial 
rourt errrd in giving the instn1ction on voluntary man-
slaugh tcr in the first instance since the evidence before the 
court could in no \vay justify the submission of the lesser 
offl'nsc of voluntary manslaughter to the jury . 
. \. It is \\Tll settled that an erroneous instruction on a 
lesser offense of the charge of homicide cannot be claimed 
as error on appeal where an accused is convicted of a 
greater charge. 26 Am. Jur., Homicide, Section 556, it is 
stated: 
"Generally speaking, an accused cannot successfully 
complain of error in instructions which are favorable 
to himself. Consequently, one who has been convicted 
of a superior grade of culpable homicide is not to be 
deemed prejudiced by and cannot attack an erroneous 
charge in respect of a lower grade of homicide." 
In 41 C.J .S., Homicide, Section 4 27 c ( 2), it is stated: 
"Ordinarily error in instructions relating to a lower 
degree of homicide or assault than that of which ac-
cused is convicted is held to be harmless, and whether 
or not it is prejudicial is controlled by the facts and the 
nature of the error. Such error generally is harmless 
\vhere the erroneous instruction relates to manslaugh-
ter and accused is convicted of murder or murder in 
the first or second degree, or where the instruction re-
lates to involuntary manslaughter and accused is con-
victed of voluntary manslaughter. Where accused is 
convicted of murder in the first degree, the giving of 
erroneous instructions on a lower degree of homicide 
is not prejudicial to accused where the evidence is 
ample to support the verdict rendered, and where the 
instructions complained of could not have misled or 
confused the jury or have had any effect on their ver-
dict, or \\"here the instruction is more favorable to 
accused than it should have been." 
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In People v. CoxJ 341 Ill. 111, 172 N.E. 64 ( 1930), the 
accused was convicted of the crime of murder. On appeal, 
it was contended that two instructions given to the jury on 
involuntary manslaughter on the request of the prosecution 
were erroneous. The Supreme Court of Illinois, in reject-
ing the contention, stated: 
"The plaintiff in error was found guilty of the major 
crime, and obviously he was not prejudiced by the in-
struction defining manslaughter." 
In King v. The Commonwealth) 224 Ky. 822, 7 S.W.2d 
228 ( 1928), the accused was convicted of murder. It was 
contended on appeal that the trial court erred in defining 
involuntary manslaughter. The Kentucky Court of Appeals 
ruled that the appellant could claim no prejudice stating: 
"Instruction No.3, defining involuntary manslaugh-
ter is criticized, but the instruction is not susceptible 
of the interpretation placed thereon by counsel for 
appellant; but, even if it were, it was not prejudicial, 
since he was convicted of murder under an instruction 
concededly proper." 
In State v. NoelJ 133 A. 274 (N.J. 1926), the appellant 
was convicted of murder in the first degree. He contended 
that the trial court erred in instruction given on murder in 
the second degree. TheN ew Jersey court agreed, but found 
that he could claim no prejudice, stating: 
''It is next insisted that the charge of the court was 
erroneous with respect to the definition of murder in 
the second degree. Admitting this to be so, it was not 
prejudicial to the defendant. The defendant was con-
victed of murder in the first degree. Murder in the first 
degree was properly defined in the charge. It therefore 
was immaterial 'vhether murder in the second degree 
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\vas properly defined. The same question has arisen in 
two recent cases in this court where the definition of 
rnurdcr in the second degree was the same as that given 
by the court, in the present case. These are the cases 
of State v. Mosley, 131 A. 292 (not yet officially re-
ported), and the case of State v. Martin, 132 A. 93 
(not yet officially reported) . In these cases this court 
held that no harm had been done to the defendant by 
incorrectly defining murder in the second degree." 
In State v. Zupkosky, 127 N.J.L. 218, 21 A.2d 771 
( 1941 ) , the appellant was convicted of murder in the first 
degree. Again the allegation was made that the trial court 
erred in its charge of murder in the second degree. The 
court ruled that no prejudice could arise from such an in-
struction. It stated: 
"It is further contended that the court erroneously 
charged the jury upon the subject of second degree 
murder. The defendant, as we have already said, was 
convicted of murder in the first degree without recom-
mendation, upon a charge with regard to the elements 
of that offense which we have found correct in the 
only respects questioned. The jury convicted the de-
fendant of murder in the first degree, upon evidence 
that. without undertaking to review, we consider fully 
supports that finding. Further, the verdict, as we for-
mally decide in the next paragraph, was not against 
the weight of evidence. Therefore, the judge's defini-
tion of murder in the second degree need not be ex-
amined or passed upon because, in the light of the 
jury's verdict, it could not have been harmful to the 
defendant. State v. Mosley, 102 N.J.L. 94, 131 A. 292, 
State v. Noel, 102 N.J.L. 659, 674, 133 A. 274. Even 
if we assume that point to be well made the error is not 
ground for reversal.'' 
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Recently, in Connor v. State, 225 Md. 543, 171 A.2d 699 
( 1961), the Maryland court was faced with a case where 
the appellant was convicted of second degree murder. He 
argued that it was err for the trial court not to distinguish 
between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter in in-
structions given to the jury. The Maryland court rejected 
any claim of prejudicial error stating: 
"***Secondly, although it appears that an instruc-
tion was given as to voluntary manslaughter (a higher 
grade than involuntary manslaughter), the jury found 
the defendant guilty of murder in the second degree, a 
finding which clearly indicates that the jury was con-
vinced that the defendant was guilty of a greater 
degree of homicide than manslaughter of either grade. 
* * *" 
In State v. Vanell, 106 P. 364 (Mont. 1910), the appel-
lant, like the appellants in the instant case, was found guilty 
of murder in the second degree and claimed that the trial 
court has erred in instructing on manslaughter. The Mon-
tana court rejected a claim that the appellant could take 
advantage of the claimed error stating: 
"* * * Even so, the defendant cannot complain. He 
was found guilty of murder in the second degree, and 
these instructions upon the subject of manslaughter 
merely gave the jury an opportunity to find him guilty 
of a lesser offense. State v. Farnham, 35 Mont. 375, 
89 Pac. 728." 
In United States v. Ransom, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 195, 15 
C.M.R. 195 ( 1954), the accused was charged with the 
crimes of murder and rape. He was convicted of the crime 
of premeditated murder and on appeal claimed that the 
trial court had erred in its instructions on unpremeditated 
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murdrr. The court, relying in part upon the authorities 
abo\T quoted, stated: 
\\Inasmuch as the instructions on premediated mur-
dt:r ''Tre correct and the court found the accused 
guilty of that offense, he could not have been harmed 
by an incorrect instruction on the lesser included 
offense.'' 
Similarly, in United States v. Henderson, 29 C.M.R. 717 
( 1960) , the accused alleged that the trial court had given 
an erroneous instruction on intent as it related to the offense 
of unpremeditated murder. The trial court had found the 
appellant guilty of murder in the first degree. Relying upon 
the Ransom case, above mentioned, it was held that no 
prejudicial error could be claimed. See also Kemp v. Canal 
Zone, 167 F.2d 938 (1948); Blalack v. State, 60 S.W.2d 
231 (Tex. Crim. 1933). 
Although the issue was not clearly considered, in State 
v. Alatteri, 119 U. 143, 225 P.2d 325 ( 1951), the court 
ruled that an erroneous instruction as to murder in the 
second degree could not be claimed as error under the cir-
cumstances. The opinion seems to imply clearly that the 
con\·iction on the charge of first degree under the facts pre-
sented vitiated any claim for prejudice. 
The appellants in the instant case are in no position to 
claim error because of the erroneous instruction on involun-
tary manslaughter. The jury was carefully and correctly 
instructed on murder in the second degree and murder in 
the first degree. In order to convict of murder in the second 
degree, it \vas necessary for the jury to find an intent to 
inflict great bodily harm. The elements necessary for the 
conviction of murder in the second degree necessarily en-
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compassed the elements in voluntary manslaughter. There-
fore, the appellants cannot claim prejudice. 
B. It is submitted that the error of the trial court in fail-
ing to instruct on the element of intent in the offense of vol-
untary manslaughter cannot be deemed prejudicial error 
since the appellants, as a matter of law, were not entitled 
to an instruction of voluntary manslaughter. The evidence 
discloses that the appellants' defense was based upon a ques-
tion of identity. No evidence was offered before the court 
that the killing took place during a quarrel or in the sudden 
heat of passion. The facts in this case show that the de-
ceased participated in the beating of one of the appellants, 
Ted Gallegos, which was a revenge beating for Gallegos 
having knifed one of the deceased's friends. The beating 
occurred on August 4, 1963. The appellant, Ted Gallegos, 
was taken to the hospital and treated. Ray Gallegos was 
not involved in the fracas. The police were notified and 
undertook an investigation. Thereafter, the Gallegos broth-
ers, along with other companions, deliberately sought out 
the deceased and Dave Albo in order to get even. At the 
time of the killing, the deceased and Mike Hoopiiana were 
walking from the latter's automobile to the Annex Bar. 
Yanes had said nothing to cause a quarrel, he had done 
nothing to provoke the response which occurred on the 
morning of the 11th of August, 1963, some seven days after 
the beating. He was approached from behind, knocked 
down and knifed through the heart. It is submitted that, 
on these facts, there "ras no evidence warranting the sub-
mission of a charge of voluntary manslaughter. 
Section 76-30-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, defines 
voluntary manslaughter as being the killing of a human 
being without malice. Section 7 6-30-5 ( 1 ) adds the follow-
ing elements: 
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"Voluntary, upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of 
. '' pass ton. 
In State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P.2d 952 ( 1963), this 
court obseiVccl as to the statutory definition, "This statutory 
definition is but declaratory of the common law." The court 
\Vas manifestly correct in its conclusion. Clark and Marshall 
Crimes, 6th Ed., Section 10.11 ; Kenny's Outlines of Crimi-
nal Law, 18th Ed. ( 1962) Section 6. It is well established 
that if the circumstances show the killer acts not in the heat 
of blood but from malice, that no issue of manslaughter is 
raised. Clark and Marshall, supra, pages 620-21 ; 1 Haw-
kins, Pleas of the Crown, chapter 11, paragraph 18. Addi-
tionally, in People v. Calton, 5 U. 451, 16 P. 902 ( 1888), 
this court upheld an instruction on voluntary manslaughter 
\vhich advised the jury that to reduce homicide to man-
slaughter on the grounds of passion or sudden quarrel, the 
provocation must be such that would give rise to an irresisti-
ble passion in the mind of a reasonable person. At common 
Ia,\·, this provocation arose in four circumstances: 
1. Violent assault. 
2. Unlawful arrest. 
3. A killing in mutual combat, provided no unfair ad-
vantages taken. 
4. A killing by the husband of the wife's paramour 
upon the discovery of adultery. 
(Clark and Marshall, supra, page 619) . 
In the instant case, the killing occurred in none of these 
circumstances. Although there was a previous assault on 
Ted Gallegos, the assault occurred seven days previous to 
the killing of Yanes. It is well settled that if the killing is 
done under circumstances which would show that the 
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"blood of the slayer had actually cooled" or that "there was 
reasonable time for such cooling," there can be no man-
slaughter. Clark and Marshall, supra, 619. In the instant 
case, the crime was done with malice and was done after 
there had been substantial opportunity for a cooling to 
occur. Indeed, the police had been notified and their in-
vestigation undertaken. Further, the evidence clearly shows 
there had been a cooling, so the killing was not done in pas-
sion but was done solely out of malice. Ray Gallegos was not 
the victim of an assault of any kind; and, therefore, could 
hardly claim the right to revenge against his brother's at-
tacker. In Clark and Marshall, supra, page 632, it is noted: 
"It is not necessary, however, in all cases, to show 
that the blood actually did cool, in order to make out 
a case of murder. It is enough to show that there was 
a reasonable time for cooling, for the law requires that 
men shall act reasonably in controlling their passions. 
The reasonable time for cooling is the time within 
which an ordinarily reasonable man would cool under 
like circumstances. * * *" 
The only evidence before the court in this case is such that 
no issue of manslaughter was raised. 
In State v. Mitchell, 3 U.2d 70, 278 P.2d 618 ( 1955), 
this court considered, among other claims of error, the con-
tention that the trial court erred in failing to instruct as to 
lesser included offenses where the defendant was convicted 
of second degree murder. The facts and circumstances in 
that case are somewhat similar to those in the instant case, 
although in that case it was not clear that the killing was 
done maliciously and that a reasonable period of cooling off 
had elapsed before the killing. This court held that the trial 
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court did not err in failing to instruct upon voluntary man-
slau,ghter. The court observed: 
"* * * Aside from the incredibility of defendant's 
testimony as to his movements, whereabouts and other 
acti\'ities, 'vith which one is impressed in reading the 
record, there is no evidence from which reasonable 
persons could conclude that the victim had died from 
a simple battery, affray, in a sudden heat of passion or 
other,vise than 'vith malice aforethought or as a result 
of a murderous intent. Under such circumstances, in-
structions as to lesser offenses would only confuse.***" 
In 41 C.J.S., Homicide, it is stated: 
"Where the evidence does not warrant the giving of 
any instruction on a certain degree of homicide lower 
than that of which accused is found guilty, the giving 
of an instruction on that lower degree, whether correct 
or incorrect as an abstract statement of law, is not 
prejudicial or reversible error. The rule is applicable 
'"here the unauthorized instruction relates to murder 
in the second degree and accused is convicted of mur-
der in the first degree; or where the instruction relates 
to murder in the third degree and accused is convicted 
of murder in the second degree; or where the instruc-
tion relates to manslaughter and accused is convicted 
of murder; or \vhere the instruction relates to involun-
tary manslaughter and the conviction is of voluntary 
manslaughter; or where the instruction relates to ag-
gravated assault and the conviction is of assault with 
intent to kill. * * *" 
See also Am. Jur., Homicide, Sections 558, 559. 
In State v. Matteri, 119 U. 143, 225 P.2d 325 ( 1951), 
the appellant \\·as convicted of first degree murder. The 
trial court instructed the jury on the crime of second degree 
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murder and left out the possibility of the killing occurring 
from an intent to kill. The court noted that unless the evi-
dence was such that a jury could reasonably decide in favor 
of second degree murder, that it would not be prejudicial 
to fail to give the correct instruction. The court found that 
the evidence did not reasonably raise the issue of second 
degree murder and concluded that the instruction could 
not have been prejudicial. The court noted, in part: 
"The only evidence bearing upon the killing of the 
deceased was that adduced by the State. There was 
no evidence direct or indirect of any mitigating cir-
cumstances. * * *" 
The facts in the instant case are somewhat the same and 
under no construction of those facts could reasonable minds 
conclude that the appellants had only committed the crime 
of voluntary manslaughter. Consequently, in accordance 
with the M atteri case, it was not err to give erroneous in-
struction on a lesser offense. See State v. Condit, 101 U. 
558, 125 P.2d 801; State v. Mewhinney, 43 U. 135, 134 P. 
632;Statev. Thorne,41 U.414, 126P.286;WarrenHomi-
cide, Vol. 4, page 403. 
In summary, it must be concluded that although the trial 
court's instruction on involuntary manslaughter was errone-
ous, the appellants were in no way prejudiced by the error 
and as a consequence can claim no basis for reversal. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN RE-
FUSING TO GIVE APPELLANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUC-
TION NO.1. 
The appellants contend the trial court committed error 
in refusing to give their requested Instruction No. 1. An 
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<·xamination of the requested instruction ( R. 30, 31 ) as 
against the instructions given, conclusively demonstrates 
that there was no error in refusing the requested instruc-
tion. First, paragraph 3 of the requested instruction was 
given in fact in several other instructions of the court. Thus, 
instructions 1, 8 and 9 (R. 32, 36,41) which the court actu-
ally gave to the jury adequately set forth the requirement 
that proof to convict be beyond all reasonable doubt and 
that the prosecution must sustain the burden from the evi-
dence to prove that guilt. 
The fourth paragraph of the requested instruction was 
not applicable to the case. The evidence presented by the 
prosecution was primarily direct evidence and the prosecu-
tion did not rely substantially upon circumstantial evidence. 
The facts concerning the motive for the crime, the intent of 
the appellants, their activities immediately preceding the 
commission of the crime and the actual commission of the 
crime \Vere testified to by witnesses who were aware of the 
facts by their direct knowledge. Mike Hoopiiana testified 
as to the identity of the killers. The appellants argue that 
the identity was not as certain as it should have been. This, 
ho\vever, is not circumstantial evidence but is merely the 
question of the weight to be given to direct evidence. What 
the appellants contend as circumstantial evidence is actu-
ally a measure of the weight to be accorded the direct testi-
mony of the eye witness to the killing. Since the prosecution 
did not rely upon mere circumstantial evidence to prove 
the elements of the crime, it cannot be successfully argued 
that Instruction No. 1, and especially paragraph 4 thereof 
which implies that the prosecution relies totally upon cir-
cumstantial evidence, should have been given. Paragraphs 
I and 2 of the requested instruction are merely abstract 
principles of law unrelated to the facts of the case. In the 
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absence of explanation, the instruction is meaningless. In 
State v. ThompsonJ 110 U. 113, 170 P.2d 153 ( 1946), this 
court admonished against the giving of instructions in the 
abstract and stated : 
"Defendant urges that the court erred in giving gen-
eral abstract instructions, using ancient and highly 
technical legal terms not understood by Ia ymen, giving 
instructions which had no application to the facts in 
this case, and in not applying the law to the facts which 
were supported by the evidence, and that the jury was 
probably misled thereby and the case should be re-
versed on that account. We have repeatedly criticized 
the giving of abstract statements of the law to the jury, 
and held that it is the duty of the court to apply the law 
to the facts supported by the evidence and to not in-
struct on any question which is not involved in the case 
under the evidence. * * * We think that it cannot be 
too strongly emphasized that the court should apply 
the law to the facts as they appear from the evidence, 
and should instruct only on the law which has a bear-
ing on facts, and in stating the necessary elements to 
constitute the crime charged it should submit to the 
jury the facts involved in the case and not merely gen-
eralizations, and where possible should avoid the use of 
technical legal terms and cumbersome definitions 
thereof, by using terms which will readily be under-
stood by laymen. In that way, the jury will be given a 
much clearer understanding of its problems. Through-
out this opinion we have attempted to observe these 
rules in our discussion of the legal questions here in-
volved." 
A giving of the appellants' requested instruction as it was 
submitted to the court would have violated the rule set out 
in State v. Thompson. This alone would justify the court 
in refusing to give the requested instruction. 
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Additionally, since the prosecution did not rely upon cir-
cumstantial evidence to any substantial degree to prove its 
case, it cannot be successfully argued that it was error to 
gi\T the requested instruction. In People v. Downer, 57 
Cal. 2d 800, 22 Cal. Rptr. 347, 372 P.2d 107 ( 1962), the 
California Supreme Court was faced with a similar condi-
tion in an incest case. The court rejected the contention of 
the appellant that the evidence relied upon was circum-
stantial. The argument made by the appellant in that case 
bears similarity to that made by the appellants in the in-
stant case. The testimony in both cases is predominantly 
\vhat the \vitnesses actually saw or heard and, therefore, 
direct evidence and not circumstantial evidence. In reject-
ing the appellants' contention, the court stated: 
"The bulk of the prosecution evidence consisted of 
direct testimony of the victim as to the acts of defend-
ant on the night of December 16. Defendant made a 
statement when he entered his daughter's bedroom 
dressed only in his underwear that he 'wanted some 
relief.' This statement showed his intention to have 
sexual relations \vith his daughter. The words had a 
"·ell-understood meaning for the daughter, because 
they '\Vere the same words he had used on a number of 
prior occasions \vhen he forced himself upon her. Thus 
the jury could conclude, based upon defendant's own 
statement, that he had the requisite specific intent to 
perpetrate the crime of incest. 
"The prosecution did not rest its case wholly, or even 
substantially, upon circumstantial evidence, and hence 
an instruction on circumstantial evidence was not re-
quired. (People v. Williams, 155 Cal.App.2d 328, 331 
[5]~ 318 P.2d 106 [hearing denied by Supreme Court]; 
cf. People v. Ely, 170 Cal.App.2d 301, 302 [2], 338 
P.2d 483; People v. Roberts, 167 Cal.App.2d 238, 242 
[3], 334 P.2d 164.)" 
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The appellants cite no case which would favor reversal 
under the circumstances of this case. Indeed, the evidence 
as it was offered to the jury was testimony of witnesses as to 
what they actually observed. Witnesses testified directly as 
to the assault upon Ted Gallegos. They testified directly as 
to Gallegos' action immediately subsequent to the assault. 
There was testimony as to the actions of Jerome and the 
Gallegos brothers indicating that they would get even with 
those who had made the assault upon Ted Gallegos. The 
testimony of Mike Hoopiiana came in in two forms: first, 
the testimony on the stand and second, his statement to the 
police officers immediately after the killing. In both in-
stances, his testimony is of facts and circumstances which he 
actually observed and heard. In both instances, he identi-
fies the Gallegos brothers as the murderers. Under these 
circumstances, it is clear that there was no basis to warrant 
giving requested Instruction No.1. 
Finally, it must be observed that the court's instructions, 
when viewed as a whole, encompassed many of the aspects 
of the requested Instruction No. 1. As to each of the crimes 
instructed upon, the jury was charged that the appellants' 
guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. They were 
instructed that they \vere the sole judges of the guilt or 
innocence of the appellants and that if they could reason-
ably explain the facts given in evidence on any reasonable 
ground other than guilt, that they should acquit the appel-
lants ( R. 54) . The instruction requested by the appellants, 
like their argument in Point 2 of the brief, bears no rela-
tionship to what actually occurred at trial. As a conse-
quence, there is no basis for reversal upon the refusal of 
appellants' requested Instruction No. 1. 
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POINT III 
TilE TRI.\L CC)URT DID NOT ERR TO THE PREJUDICE 
C>F TII.E APPELLA0!1'S NOR WERE THEY DENIED DUE 
PRC1CESS OF LAW. 
In Point 3 of the appellants' brief, they contend that 
there is collective error on the part of the trial court to such 
an extent that they were denied a fair trial and, conse-
quently, due process of law. The appellants have set out 
claims of error in Points A through H. The respondent sub-
mits that none of the claims of error are in any manner col-
lectively or singularly such as to warrant reversal. 
A. The appellants contend that the trial court erred by 
gi\'ing oral instructions. An analysis of the record shows 
that this is not correct. The trial court prepared written in-
structions which were given to the jury and which were 
served upon counsel (R. 32-54). Subsequent to the read-
ing of the instructions, the trial court explained to the jury 
\rhy the alternate juror was being discharged, it presented 
the verdicts to the court and advised them as to their liber-
ties of deliberation. He also indicated that he would allow 
them to deliberate until 7: 00 p.m. at which time he would 
consult \vith them and ascertain their desires so far as din-
ner \ras concerned. He explained to them how to contact 
the bailiff should they desire to go to the lavatory (R. 361-
362). It is submitted that none of these things in fact con-
stitute instructions on the case. They were not instructions 
on the la\v nor on the evidence, nor actually in any way re-
lated to "·hat is commonly considered the instructions to the 
jury on the Ia"· of the case. At best, they could be considered 
as admonitions to the jurors and a statement of some of the 
practicalities concerning their deliberations. Even if it could 
be assumed that these were oral instructions, the appellants 
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may not claim error of any kind on that basis for a variety 
of reasons. 
First, subsequent to the court's statements, counsel for the 
appellants took an exception ( R. 362) . Counsel said he 
would withdraw exceptions if the jury would be called back 
and advised that a desirable verdict should be rendered to 
the defendants as well as the state and that a previous in-
formal request of counsel for the appellants be submitted 
to the jurors ( R. 363-364) . Thereafter the jurors were re-
called and advised as appellants' counsel had requested 
( R. 364) and appellants' counsel expressly stated that he 
had nothing further to add concerning the matter. Con-
sequently, an express waiver of any error appears in the 
record. 
Second, it is submitted that there is no requirement that 
the jury be instructed in writing. Section 77-31-1, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, establishes the order of trial. Sub-
section 5 of that provision provides: "When the evidence 
is concluded, the court must charge the jury as in civil ac-
tions." This provision was enacted into law by Section 4845 
of the Revised Statutes of 1898. The compiled Laws of 
1917, Section 6802, set out the mode of instructing jurors 
in civil cases. It provided that the court "shall instruct the 
jury in writing upon the law applicable to the case." This 
provision was repealed with the promulgation by the court 
of the rules of civil procedure. Rule 51 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure was substituted for 104-24-14, Utah 
Code Annotated 1943. Contrary to the assertion of the ap-
pellants, Rule 51 does not use the same language as the 
previous provision. It absolutely does not say that the jurors 
shall be instructed in writing. It provides that the court 
shall inform counsel of its proposed action on request prior 
to instructing the jury and that it shall furnish counsel with 
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a copy of its proposed instructions unless the parties stipu-
late that instructions may be given orally. It then provides 
that if instructions are to be given in writing, all objections 
n1ust be made before the jury is instructed. This court has 
ncvr.r ruled as to what Rule 51 requires. It is submitted that 
it requires the following: 
First, that the court may instruct either orally or in writ-
ing. Ho\\Tvcr, if the instructions are to be given in writing, 
he need only serve counsel with copies of the instructions 
prior to their being given to the jury. If this is completed, 
the requirement of Rule 51 is met. Counsel may waive writ-
ten instruction at \vhich time no instructions need be served 
upon counsel. In the instant case, counsel expressly waived 
\\Titten instructions if the court would recall the jury and 
ad\·ise them, as the court in fact did. 
~\dditionally, Rule 51 would not seem to prohibit the 
court in giving oral instructions which are not those "on the 
la\r. ,, 
Finally, it should not be noted that everything the court 
in fact did "·as taken down. 
In J"anCottv. Wall, 53 U. 282, 178P.42, thiscourtindi-
cated that under the previous provisions of Section 104-24-
14, Utah Code Annotated 1943, that if the instructions 
\vcre incorporated into the record on appeal and if they 
appeared to correctly state the law applicable so that no 
prejudice results, reversal is not warranted. In State v. Fin-
n C)', 141 Kan. 12,40 P.2d 411 ( 1935), the Kansas Supreme 
Court ("·here the trial court gave almost identical instruc-
tions to the jury as those given here) held that such instruc-
tions do not violate the requirement that instructions be in 
,,·riting. Instructions given in the Kansas case were to the 
jury as to how they should mark their ballot. See also Ander-
son l'. The Commonwealth, 205 Ky. 369, 265 S.W. 824. It 
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appears that appellants can claim no basis for error on the 
form of the court's instructions. 
B. Appellants' argument that the trial court's ruling 
prejudiced them because it denied them their motion to dis-
miss where the motion was made under the understanding 
that it was made as if it were at the conclusion of the de-
fense's request, is without merit. If the prosecution had pre-
sented a prima facie case, then no matter what the defense 
presented, the issue would be one for the jury's deliberation. 
In the instant case~ the prosecution had established a kill-
ing, that the killing was under felonious circumstances, and 
that the appellants were the murderers. The prosecution 
had at the time of the ruling made out a case upon which it 
was entitled to go to the jury and, consequently, the trial 
court correctly overruled the defendants' motion to dismiss. 
Further, this in no way could prejudice the appellants since 
the evidence that was offered in their defense in no way de-
tracted from the validity of the court's ruling. In fact, the 
defense evidence could best be categorized as innocuous as 
respects its effect upon the case the state had presented. 
C. The trial court definitely did not err in giving In-
struction No. 9. The appellants argue that the instruction 
was prejudicial because it allowed the jury to find the ap-
pellants guilty of second degree murder because of their "in-
tending injury without death." In State v. Russell, 106 U. 
116, 145 P.2d 1003 ( 1944), this court indicated that the 
intention was: 
" ( 1 ) An intention or design previously formed to kill 
or cause great bodily injury; or (2) an intention or 
design previously formed to do an act or omit to do an 
act, knowing that the reasonable and natural conse-
quences thereof would be likely to cause death or great 
bodily injury;***.'' 
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'Thus the Russell case adopted the recognized rule that 
unpremeditated murder can be satisfied by one of two in-
tentions: first, the intent to kill, or second, the intent to do 
great bodily harm. The finding of either intent will be suffi-
cit·nt to "·arrant a conviction. In the instant case, the jury 
was instructed: 
''3. That 'vhen the defendants, or either of them, 
struck the fatal blow he or they had a specific design 
or intention, thought out beforehand, to cause great 
bodily injury to the deceased, OR an intention or 
design thought out beforehand to do an act, know-
ing the reasonable and natural consequences thereof 
would be likely to cause great bodily injury to the 
deceased;" 
This instruction was directly in line with the alternative 
instructions set out in the Russell case. The trial court was 
apparently of the opinion that there was no intention to kill 
on the part of the appellants but that they intended to in-
flict great bodily harm. In so instructing the jury, the in-
struction "·as to the advantage of the appellants since if the 
jurors felt that the appellants had intended to kill and not 
merely inflict great bodily harm, they might have acquitted. 
It is clear that the jury did in fact find an intention on the 
part of the appellants, which readily appears from the evi-
dence, to inflict great bodily harm upon the deceased. 
InState v. Jensen, 120 U. 531,236 P.2d 445 ( 1951), Jus-
tice Crockett stated the intent required for second degree 
murder: 
"With respect to his intent: It is the established law 
of this state that in order to make the crime of second 
degree murder the defendant must have intended to 
either (a) kill, or (b) do great bodily harm, or (c) do 
an act \vhich \\rould naturally and probably cause 
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death or great bodily harm to the deceased. State v. 
Thompson, 110 Utah 113, 170 P.2d 153; State v. Tru-
jillo, Utah, 214 P.2d 626." 
This decision appears to be the most recent expression of 
this court as to the intent required in second degree murder 
and clearly the language of the opinion is couched in al-
ternative terms. In State v. Thompson, 110 U. 113, 170 
P.2d 153 ( 1946), this court again stated that the element of 
murder was in the alternative. It commented: 
"* * * Thus there can be no murder, either in the 
first or second degree, without a planned, designed or 
thought out beforehand intention to kill or cause great 
bodily injury, or to do an act knowing that the natural 
and probable consequences thereof would be to cause 
death or great bodily injury to some other person, or 
to commit certain types of felonies. * * *" 
In State v. Trujillo, 117 U. 237, 214 P.2d 626 ( 1950), 
Justice Pratt stated that the failure of the court to instruct 
upon the requirement of intent in charging of murder in 
the second degree could be prejudicial by misleading the 
jury in thinking that if they found an intent to kill, they 
must find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree. 
The court reversed the Trujillo case where the jury in fact 
had convicted of murder in the first degree. The opinion 
of Justice Pratt, which is the only opinion of the court on 
the matter, was concerned with the prejudice of the instruc-
tion on the conviction of first degree murder feeling that the 
erroneous instruction would compel a conviction of first 
degree murder if the jury found an intent to kill. He stated: 
"* * * The effect of such a limitation is to impress 
the jury with the thought that if the intent to kill was 
present, then the offense must be murder in the first 
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degree; "·hercas, if the. intent is that of doing great 
bodily harm, it is murder in the second degree, depend-
ing of course, upon the other elements necessary.***" 
Such is not the case in this situation since the jury convicted 
the lowest crime which was raised by the evidence. The 
absence of an intent to kill in second degree murder and 
instruction upon the intent to inflict great bodily harm as 
noted above, "·auld not have prejudiced the appellants, but 
in fact \\·ould only have helped them. The Trujillo case is 
no precedent for claiming error in this case and indeed the 
opinion of the majority does not seem to be the law in this 
jurisdiction since only Justice Pratt appeared to follow that 
vic\r. Justices Wade, Wolfe and McDonough concurred 
separately and Justice Latimer dissented. 
It \\·auld seem obvious that the primary difference be-
t\\'een first and second degree murder is that in the latter 
case, there is an absence of premeditation and deliberation. 
The failure to instruct upon intent to kill could only be 
prejudicial in a conviction for first degree murder. It is sub-
mitted that it would be as erroneous for a trial judge to in-
struct in the alternative of an intent to kill or inflict great 
bodily hatm \vhere the evidence did not raise the issue of an 
intent to kill, as it \\·ould be in any other case to instruct upon 
an element which is not raised by the evidence. In any 
event, since the appellants were found guilty of murder in 
the second degree and murder in the second degree requires 
either the intent to kill or the intent to inflict great bodily 
harm, the instruction of the trial court could not have been 
prejudicial. 
D. The appellants contend that the giving of Instruction 
Xo. 12 ,,·as improper. The instruction was wholly proper 
because the question of intent to kill was raised by the 
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court's instructions on first degree murder ( R. 39). The 
instruction, therefore, was proper with reference to that 
charge. Paragraph 3 of that instruction was directly in 
accord with this court's decision in State v. Thompson, 
supra, State v. Trujillo, supra, and State v. jensen, supra. 
It is a correct evidentiary statement. The appellants' final 
contention with reference to Instruction No. 12 that there 
is no definition for the jury of the word "assailed" can be 
answered by pointing out that it is a term of general recog-
nized meaning and requires no specific definition since it is 
intelligible to the layman. Additionally, the appellants re-
quested no definition from the court nor did they except to 
the failure of the court to define the term. They are, there-
fore, procluded from having the matter reviewed on appeal. 
E. The appellants' contention that given Instruction 
No. 15 was prejudicial as to Ray Gallegos because there 
was no evidence of his participation is erroneous. Suffice is 
to say there was substantial evidence of Ray Gallegos' par-
ticipation. Hoopiiana testified that Ray Gallegos took a cut 
at Yanes as he fell to the ground. Further, Ray Gallegos 
held a knife on Hoopiiana to keep him from interfering. 
Appellants' argument that this is "prevention" and not 
"participation" is too absurd to warrant answer. 
F. Given Instruction No. 16 was excepted to because the 
word "defendant" was used. However, Instruction No. 3 
was sufficient to advise the jury that where "defendants" is 
used, it is referable to one or both of the defendants and no 
intelligent person could claim confusion on that matter. 
G. Appellants contend that given Instruction No. 18 
was erroneous because they allege that the court instructed 
the word "wilful" was synonymous with "intentional." A 
reading of Instruction No. 18 ( R. 49-51 ) , discloses that 
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this is not a correct interpretation of the instruction. The 
\Vord ~\"ilfur' \vas defined as follows: 
'''The \vords 'wilful, and 'wilfully' when applied to 
the intent \vith "·hich an act is done imply simply a 
purpose or \villingness to commit the act, and do not 
require any intent to violate the law, or to injure 
another, or to acquire advantage." 
The words "intent" and "specific intent" were defined as 
follO\VS: 
"The 'vord 'intent' means intention, design, resolve; 
a determination of the mind. 
"The term 'specific intent' means a fixed direction 
of the mind to a particular object, or a determination 
to act in a particular manner." 
It is obvious, therefore, from a mere reading of the instruc-
tions, that the court did not instruct that "wilful" was syn-
onymous \vith "intentional." Further, the exceptions which 
the appellants took in the trial court to Instruction No. 18 
did not allege such a grounds as a defect. Having failed to 
specify such a ground in exception at the trial level, the 
appellants may not claim error on review. 
H. The appellants contend that it was error for the trial 
court to give Instruction No. 20. Instruction No. 20 advised 
the jury on t\\'O points: One, that physical retaliation for 
the purposes of revenge is not a defense to the commission 
of murder; and t\\·o, that evidence of physical retaliation 
for defense purposes could be used to establish motive. Both 
of these elements in the instruction are correct statements of 
the Ia,,·. Indeed, the appellants' argument under Section H 
of their brief leaves some question in the mind of the reader 
as to just "·hat the appellants are protesting against. Ap-
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parently the appellants contend that this instruction was 
not warranted by the evidence. This is, of course, without 
merit. The evidence disclosed Yanes' participation in the 
assault on Ted Gallegos, it also disclosed that the Gallegos 
brothers and others were bent upon revenge for all persons 
who had participated in the assault. It is a correct state-
ment of law that revenge is not a defense to a crime. See 
authorities infra, page 13. It is equally well established that 
motive may be considered as evidence in determining guilt 
or Innocence. 
In summary, it is submitted that the contentions made in 
the appellants' brief A through H, are wholly without 
merit. For the most part, the claimed errors are not errors 
at all and would provide no basis in any common law juris-
diction to allow the appellants to escape punishment for 
their crime. Secondly, those claims which may show some 
minor impropriety are substantially far removed from any 
situation where specific prejudice could be claimed. Sec-
tion 77--42-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides: 
"After hearing an appeal the court must give judg-
ment without regard to errors or defects which do not 
affect the substantial rights of the parties. If error has 
been committed, it shall not be presumed to have re-
sulted in prejudice. The court must be satisfied that 
it has that effect before it is warranted in reversing the 
judgment." 
In the instant case, there is absolutely no evidence of 
record which would lead a reasonable man to conclude the 
appellants were not afforded a fair trial. 
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CO~CLUSION 
·rhc factual record of this case discloses a senseless, re-
vengeful murder which is intolerable in any civilized so-
ciety. The criminal conduct which permeates this record is 
reprehensible in the extreme. The district attorney who 
pros<'cuted the case did an excellent job in presenting to the 
jury the motive and background for the murder and clearly 
provrd the appellants, guilt beyond all reasonable doubt. 
The legal errors which the appellants claim warrant re-
Vt.'rsal either do not exist or are totally without prejudicial 
effect. 
Jurors are no less conscious of their duty with respect to 
determining the guilt and innocence of persons accused of 
murder than are judges who oversee the cases. There is no 
sho\ving of any substantial error to warrant this court in 
granting the appellants' relief. This court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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